Speaker: Łukasz Cholewa (Krakow University of Economics)
Time: 2025-12-17 16:00-17:00
Location: 1110, SIMIS
Zoom Meeting ID: 826 9198 8223 Passcode: SIMIS
摘要：
Precise description of population game dynamics introduced by revision protocols – an economic model describing the player’s (or agent’s) propensity to switch to a better-performing strategy – is of importance in economics and social sciences in general. In this setting, imitation of others and innovation are forces that drive the evolution of the economic system. While the continuous-time game dynamics is relatively well understood, the same cannot be said about revision-driven dynamics in discrete time. We investigate the behavior of agents using revision protocols in a 2× 2 anti-coordination game with symmetric random matching and a unique mixed Nash equilibrium. We show that in the discrete time setting, for any such game, one can construct a revision protocol (either innovative or imitative) such that if a large enough fraction of agents revise their choices, the game dynamics becomes Li-Yorke chaotic, inducing complex and unpredictable behavior of the system, precluding stable predictions of equilibrium. This is in stark contrast to the continuous case. Furthermore, we show that revision protocols leading to chaotic behavior can be very natural and have a simple economic interpretation. In fact, we can obtain them as slight modifications of one of the best-known imitation models: Pairwise Proportional Imitation. These results show that one should expect complex behavior of revision-driven game dynamics even in very simple games. The talk will be based on joint work with Jakub Bielawski and Fryderyk Falniowski.
About Speaker
Łukasz Cholewa is an Assistant Professor at the Krakow University of Economics, who studies One-Dimensional Dynamical Systems, Economics, and their intersection. Prior to that, he completed his PhD with Professor Piotr Oprocha at AGH University, where he studied Renormalization properties of Lorenz maps.
简体中文 
English